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This paper is not what its published title promises. It
is not an exploration of the place of virtue in the
professional life of the health care provider. Rather,
this is the preamble to such a paper. It is an attempt
to sort through my own disquietude about current
theory in biomedical ethics. I have tried to do this
sorting by reviewing and pulling together the threads
of a number of the more compelling, recent critiques
of prevalent ethical theories. Basically, I am trying
to answer three questions: What prompts me to
think there is a problem? Who else thinks there is a
problem? And, what are the general parameters of
this problem?
But, I begin with a little history--
In the 1973 annual oration of the Society for Health
and Human Values, Edmund Pellegrino advocated a
new rapprochement between philosophy and
medicine, between Minerva and Aesculapius.
Pellegrino foresaw mutual benefit resulting from this
rapprochement. Philosophy could reinfuse "critical
intelligence into medical thought, practice, and
education. " It could enable the new medicine to
develop a "'new' value system to match its
potentialities." 1 And medicine, he hoped, could be
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instrumental in philosophy's reclaiming its role as a
"significant factor in culture. "2 High hopes!
Almost ten years later, in 1982, Stephen Toulmin
concludes in his article, "How Medicine Saved the
Life of Ethics," that the "interaction with medicine,
law, and the other professions (in the 20 years prior)
has had spectacular and irreversible effects on the
methods and content of philosophical ethics."
Toulmin continues,
By re-introducing into ethical debate the vexed topics raised
by particular cases, they have obliged philosophers to address
once again the Aristotelian problems of practical reasoning,
which had been on the sidelines too long. In this sense, we
may indeed say that, during the last 20 years, medicine has
'saved the life of ethics', and that it has given back to ethics a
seriousness and human relevanc which it had seemed--at least,
in the writings of the interwar years--to have lost for good. 3
Not everyone in philosophy has appreciated either
this "new rapprochement" or this "resuscitation."
Not everyone in philosophy has welcomed the
preoccupation with practice or "clinical ethics", with
the emergence of physicians or other health
professional "upstarts" attempting to "do" ethics
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without philosophical portfolio.
Nor has everyone in medicine taken kindly to the
intrusion of philosophy and philosopher/ethicists into
the medical education curriculum, into the hospital
committee structure, or onto the patient bedside.
Nonetheless, both philosophy and medicine have
reaped some harvest from this cross fertilization.
But is the harvest of the sort that Pellegrino and even
Toulmin anticipated? Has philosophy given order
and a viable value system to medicine? Has
medicine truly humanized philosophy and returned it
to cultural significance?
If we were to use bibliographies as an indicator of
the extent to which the "critical intelligence" of
philosophy has been infused into medical thought,
practice, and education, we would declare the
rapprochement a success. The literature of what has
come to be known as "biomedical ethics" is
voluminous. New special journals have been
developed and innumerable books have been
published. The sources of all of this scholarship
include both philosophical ethicists and health
professionals, some with formal education in
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philosophical ethics or bioethics, and some without
The number of textbooks available provide evidence
of the proliferation of academic courses or programs
over the past twenty years. Ethics rounds have been
established in clinical settings to enable students and
practitioners alike to cultivate their sensitivities to the
moral dimension of their practice and to sharpen their
skills at addressing the moral problems that they
face. However, even with all of this education and
this published philosophical reflection on the practice
of medicine and the delivery of health care, I believe
that vexing, fundamental problems and doubts
remain about this rapprochement. Now, perhaps,
even more than at the time twenty years ago when
Danner Clouser first made the observation, this
"mixed marriage" of philosophical ethics and
medicine is in need of counseling.4
The doubts about this relationship are of two related
sorts and they go to the heart of Pellegrino's
expected outcomes of the "new rapprochement".
First, there are doubts about the applicability of
philosophical theory to medical practice.
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7Second, there are related or consequent doubts about
the adequacy of the present ethical theories that we
are attempting to apply to medicine. These are not
simply doubts that the deontologist might have about
the utilitarian or vice versa. Rather, these are, for the
most part, doubts about the adequacy of the sort of
ethic that has evolved to address the complex ethical
challenges of medicine.
For the most part, the first of these doubts, those
about the applicability of theory to medical practice
arise from observing the practice of philosophical
ethics; and those doubts about the suitability of the
prevailing medical ethic or value system arise from
observing the practice of medicine or health care. Let
us look now at how some of these doubts are being
articulated in the current biomedical ethics literature.
I'll begin with the fIrst of these misgivings. Albert
Jonsen has long been skeptical about our ability to
link specific practice or particular moral judgments to
ethical theory. In a recent review of the 1989 edition
of the Beauchamp and Childress textbook, Principles
of Biomedical Ethics, Jonsen notes that he is not
alone in his skepticism. Jonsen points out that in the
three successive re-editions of the Beauchamp and
Childress text the authors express a diminishing
confidence in our ability to find a higher-order ethical
theory from which middle-level principles can be
derived and to which we can appeal in making
particular moral judgments.S
Jonsen and others, including, probably, any number
of medical ethics instructors who use case method,
describe a phenomenon that has prompted some of
the doubts about the significance of theory for
practice. They observe that when groups of people
discuss and attempt to resolve particular moral
dilemmas or cases studies, advocates of diverse,
even opposing, ethical theories often come to the
same conclusion or practical judgment. Jonsen uses
the example of the deliberations of the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine to illustrate this phenomenon--this ability to
achieve consensus around specific cases in spite of
differences in theory. 6
In his book, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of
Moral Reasoning, written with Stephen Toulmin,
Jonsen proposes a return to the use of casuistry; that
is, a return to arguing or deciding a particular case
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based on prior cases or precedence, as in the practice
of common-law. lonsen sees casuistry as a viable
and defensible alternative to the often times fruitless
traditional practice of deducing moral practice from
ethical theory.
However, lonsen and Toulmin's pragmatic solution
presupposes some common moral intuition and a
common cultural framework in order to successfully
argue cases. But as George Annas and other critics
of casuistry have pointed out, "Part of our current
malaise is that we appear to lack such common
ground. "7 Although lonsen's solution is not a
totally convincing one, his search does underscore
our inability to cleanly link practice to some one
higher order theory which we all affInn.
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Leon Kass, in a recent article marking the twentieth
anniversary of the Hastings Center, also presents a
sweeping critique of the practice of biomedical ethics
today and puzzles over its relationship to the
everyday practice of medicine or health care.8 In his
critique, Kass voices doubts about both the
applicability and the suitability of the ethic of
medicine. For Kass our problems with application
of theory are a consequence of the nature of the
theory we are trying to apply. How, Kass wonders,
can our current, highly rationalistic philosophical
ethics--given to abstractions, to rules or sometimes
guidelines-- facilitate moral decisionmaking in the
often complex, sometimes critical and confusing,
sometimes routine and frustrating, always
contextual, daily practice of medicine and health
care?
Philosophical ethics today, Kass contends, as do I,
is not only rationalist but "hyper-rational." He states:
The dominant mode of American philosophizing today remains
analytic. It concerns itself with the analysis of concepts, the
evaluation of arguments, and the criticism of justifications,
always in search of clarity, consistency, coherence. It spends
little time on what genuinely moves people to act--their
motives and passions: that is, loves and hates, hopes and
fears, pride and prejudice, matters that are sometimes dismissed
as nonethical or as irrational because they are not simply
reducible to logos.9
"Rationality at work," Kass notes further, "is above
all a problem-solver." And rationalistic philosophical
ethics, in its approach to medicine and health care,
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isolates and focuses on problems which it abstracts
and analyzes. The problems most appealing for
such analysis are the problems of extremes. So, the
"morality of ordinary practice,Kass observes, "is
largely ignored."IO Further, in so far as the problem
solving process is rigorously rational, the solutions
are often "purely rational" rules to govern conduct,
or ideals toward which we should strive. "The
methodical rationality of procedure," Kass
complains," is put in place of the discerning
reasonableness of the prudent man-on-the-spot that
all real choices demand." 11 In addition, our current
theory too often leads us away from the confounding
moral complexities of our medical practice, to search
for simple, clean, minimalist principles--autonomy or
benevolence, and the like.
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Other participants in and observers of medical and
health care practice echo, from a variety of
perspectives, Kass's critique of a rationalistic
approach that can deal only with abstractions or with
ideals, or with clear cut rules logically applied.
Clinicians are confronting increasing numbers of
disconcerting medical or health care practice issues
that are not readily or suitably resolved with such an
approach. Let's look at some of these examples.
Some of them, I should note, have arisen as a
consequence of our incredible achievements in
medical and biological technology and research
(once again validating the warning that "... today's
achievement is only tomorrow's confusion"). In
looking at these practice issues, I will focus on only
one of the central ethical principles in biomedical
ethics, i.e., autonomy. And the practice issues to
which I will refer will be limited to: 1) the care of
impaired elderly and the decisionally incompetent, 2)
the cost of and access to health care, and 3) the
treatment of persons with AIDS. My purpose is not
to defend or deny the solutions provided by the
authors presented but rather to point up the problems
that they identify, most of which I also recognize as
such.
Autonomy in biomedical ethics in the U.S. has been
pivotal--even sacrosanct. The practical application of
the traditional notion of autonomy to the everyday
care of the impaired elderly or of persons in a
persistent vegetative state has left clinicians and
ethicists alike unsettled. Several recent authors have
12
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identified and attempted to address the limitations of
the principle of autonomy as it has been articulated or
interpreted to date.
James Childress, in the past a dedicated proponent of
autonomy, has attempted in a recent article to re-
articulate its meaning. Autonomy, Childress now
informs us, is complex because real persons are
complex; they are not idealizations or abstractions.
There can be no simple or, as he puts it, "no
mechanical application of a clear-cut moral principle"
here. Sometimes when we make a supposedly
autonomous choice, we don't know what we are
choosing, sometimes we contradict ourselves,
sometimes we change our minds, sometimes we
choose one thing but really would choose another if
we weren't being intimidated--and this applies to you
and me and not only to the impaired elderly or others
who are decision ally incompetent.12 The patient's
history, values, and context, Childress asserts, must
be considered when trying to determine if an act is
autonomous. The autonomous individual is not an
abstraction.
George Agich, moves the discussion of autonomy
even more emphatically from the realm of abstraction
into the realm of daily reality. "Traditional treatments
of autonomy," Agich observes, "simply abstract
from actual examples of finite human autonomy and
context of choice and focus instead on idealizations
of autonomous action and choice." 13 Agich calls
for, i.nstead, a "refurbished, concrete concept of
autonomy that systematically attends to the history
and development of persons and takes account of the
experiences of daily living."14 "Actual" (in contrast
to "ideal") autonomy, as Agich defmes it, is complex
and "clearly less neat" than the traditional view. For
him, "Expressions of (actual) autonomy are ... the
playing out of who the individual is as well as who
the individual is becoming; the field or state for such
'playing out' is the social world of everyday life." 15
In addition, Agich contends that to understand
autonomy one must understand how individuals are
interconnected. We must understand, also, the place
of habit in daily life. We must understand that
habitual actions, if consistent with one's self-identity
are as autonomous as those actions that arise from
"reflective, deliberative decisionmaking.16 They
cannot be denied or dismissed.
14
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John Hardwig, in his article "What about the
Family?," explores even further this notion of
interconnectedness in autonomy, especially as it
relates to the impaired elderly or the decisionally
incompetent. In the traditional or idealized view of
autonomy, individualism is central, relationships or
interconnectedness are peripheral or less. Hardwig
observes, however, that
The way we analyze medical treatment decisions by or for
patients is plainly anomalous to the way we think about other
important decisions family members make. I am a husband, a
father, and still a son, and no one would argue that I should or
even responsibly could decide to take a sabbatical, another job,
or even a weekend trip solely on the basis of what I want for
myself. Why should decisions about my medical treatment be
different? Why should we have even thought that medical
treatment decisions might be different? 17
Hardwig warns that to adhere to an individualistic,
disconnected concept of autonomy in medical ethics
will serve only to isolate the individual patient more
and to diminish the role and importance of
relationships and of comrnunity.l8
Let us continue to look at autonomy but move now
from concerns related to the care of the impaired
elderly and the decisionally incompetent to the issues
of health care cost and access. Concerns-- if not
panic-- about the cost of medical and health care and
the allocation of these resources are also leading
theorists to try to re-articulate or revise the traditional
view of autonomy. A number of critics are
advocating, as I have noted, a return to the
consideration of our interconnectedness or
community. One example of such an attempt is
presented by Danis and Churchill in their article,
"Autonomy and the Common Weal."19 The authors
review the current critical state of access to health
care and examine, as well, the debate about the role
that the individual physician should play in
addressing the cost issue. Should the physician be
society's gatekeeper to health care resources,
especially those that are costly? Some clinicians, like
Pellegrino, declare that the physician must be the
advocate of his/her patient solely and that the
physician ought not be, simultaneously, an
instrument of social justice. If one follows this line
of thought, considerations of the cost of diagnostic
or treatment modalities should not enter into the
physician's deliberations when treating an individual
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patient. Others, however, consider this bracketing
of cost issues as irresponsible and contributing to the
growing cost and access crisis. Danis and Churchill
suggest that perhaps both sides are somewhat
correct. They recommend a "new integrated moral
framework" to resolve this conflict. The authors
propose a concept of citizenship to undergird this
new framework--not an altogether original concept.
Both the physician and the patient, the authors
contend, must see themselves, and accept their role,
as citizen. As citizens, both belong to "something
larger than self, or (their) particular individual
relationships." This larger than self perspective must
balance the perspective of the autonomous
individual.
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Certainly, this proposed new framework is not .till:
total answer to the crisis over health care access and
cost, but its suggestion does, again, underscore the
inadequacy of a principle of autonomy that isolates
the individual.
Most of the examples that I have just reviewed deal
with the growing realization that our ethical theory
deals too much with abstractions or ideals. More
specifically, in the cases reviewed, it deals with the
"ideal autonomy" or with the individual as an
abstraction rather than with the actual and the
concrete. What has been suggested in varying ways
by the authors reviewed, is a principle of autonomy
that recognizes and respects the history, context, and
interconnectedness of the person who is patient.
There is yet another important facet of the rationalism
of our prevailing biomedical ethical theories that we
must consider. It is the emphasis on principles and
rules, rights and obligations, and the de-emphasis on
the consideration of those factors that truly move
people to act morally. Kass observes that the
rationalistic approach,
speaks little about motives and attitudes, and still less does it
concern itself with figuring out how to get people to do what
theory says is best. Universalist in conception, it cares little
for the variety of human types, some move by the love of
gain, others by the love of honor, some by reverence, others
by fear, still others by pleasure. In short, it treats the rational
content of speech and argument without regard to the engaged
concerns that incite both speech and action. It by and large
ignores mores and customs, sentiments and attitudes, and the
"small morals" that are the bedrock of ordinary experience and
the matrix of all interpersonal relations. It by and large
ignores real moral agents and concrete moral situations,
18
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preferring the abstraction of the hypostatized "rational
decisionmaker" confronting the idealized problem needing to be
solved ... Though originally intended to improve our deeds, the
reigning practice of ethics, if truth be told, has, at best,
improved our speech.20
If we do indeed want an ethics that enables us to
make a practical moral difference, then we must be
concerned about moving both the patient and the
provider to action. Any number of other theorists,
past and present, have troubled over this challenge,
as well.
In current medical and health care practice, the
conflicts that have arisen over the care of persons
who are HIV positive or who have AIDS have forced
this challenge to the forefront. Is an ethic of
obligation and rights that also stresses autonomous
individualism adequate to moving providers to act
responsibly in the face of the AIDS epidemic.
In a 1987 article, Abigail Zuger, a physician who did
her residency training in the wards of Bellevue
Hospital in New York City, aptly addresses these
"physician-oriented" ethical issues. "Is a physician
ethically obliged to care for a patient with AIDS?
What does the care of these patients do to the
physician's training, practice, and quality of life?"
Zuger asks)!
It is the case that a number of physicians, dentists,
residents, nurses, respiratory therapists, and others,
have explicitly refused to treat or to care for persons
with AIDS or with mv infection. Zuger points out,
however, that there are many more subtle forms of
refusal to treat. She describes the AIDS patient who
is never visited on morning rounds for any number
of specious reasons-- "there's nothing new to say; all
the students upset him; the intern will come back and
talk to him later." Or there is the person with AIDS
in the emergency room whom caregivers delay in
seeing--procrastinating because they know the
difficulties to be faced. And, the author observes,
"Probably most common of all. .. are the refusals
that never take place," because interns, residents,
physicians, and other health professionals simply
avoid training or practicing in facilities in which they
may have to provide care for persons with AIDS. As
the epidemic spreads, however, this form of
avoidance will be more and more difficult to
20
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accomplish. I would add the personnel shortage
crisis we are experiencing in the field of medical
technology--some of which has been attributed to
AIDS--as another example of refusal to care.
The reluctance of physicians and of other health
professionals to care for patients with AIDS, Zuger
reports, can be ascribed to a number of difficulties
that must be faced in delivering that care. Fear of
infection, although the most frequently cited, is
perhaps the least important, she notes. Some of the
other difficulties in delivering care relate to the nature
of the various diseases called AIDS. For example,
these diseases can be palliated but seldom cured; they
are debilitating, depressing, and often times ugly--
causing, in varying cases, unrelenting diarrhea, skin
lesions, physical wasting, neurological impairment,
blindness, and unremitting pain; their treatment
requires esoteric knowledge that is rapidly changing;
and the care required is time consuming, requires
inconvenient precautions and is technically
sophisticated. Other causes of the reluctance to care
relate to the AIDS patient. As Zuger notes, "These
needy, time-consuming patients are all too frequently
persons whom many physicians (and other care
providers) have inherent difficulty in accepting."22
They may be gay, IV drug users, or prostitutes--
ready targets, even precluding the disease, for
misunderstanding at best, as well as acrimony and
blame. It is within this context that the question of
the responsibility of and the motivation for the health
care professional to provide care is raised.
Zuger does not give a definitive response to her
original question about the ethical obligation to treat.
Rather she describes the full spectrum of responses
that have been made by individual physicians and
those that have been counseled or mandated by
various physicians groups. Interestingly, she entitles
this section of her article "A Spectrum of Self-
Sacrifice." Zuger includes both the joint statement of
the American College of Physicians and the
Infectious Disease Society of America, issued in
early 1986 and the AMA statement issued in late
1986. The former is brief and clear: "denying
appropriate care to sick and dying patients for any
reason in unethical." The latter hedges: it allows that
"not everyone is emotionally able to care for patients
with AIDS."
22
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To my mind, given all of "the parameters (the
difficulties and constraints) that define the medical
care of patients with AIDS," as Zuger and others
have experienced and articulated them, an ethics of
rights and obligations, of autonomous individualism,
cannot alone make a practical moral difference or
move the health professional to act responsibly. I
believe that looking at the delivery of care for the
elderly in long-term care facilities prompts the same
sort of conclusion. Some of the same parameters
exist in the context of the care for this population as
in the care of persons with AIDS.
From my own observation of clinical practice, both
with AIDS patients and the impaired elderly, Iknow
that the health care provider needs more than a sense
of duty or obligation just to sustain him or her. I
know, too, that to treat or to provide care for the
AIDS patient or impaired elderly resident, the health
care provider will need patience, endurance, courage,
loyalty, prudence, considerateness, to mention just a
few virtues or moral habits.
With some few exceptions - such as Pellegrino,
Drane, Kass - these characteristics or virtues are
seldom, if ever, brought up in our discussions of
rights and obligations. We shy away from speaking
of virtue and character, even in our educational
process. We fear it will sound like moralizing. We
fear the accusations of not being "rational" or of
abandoning philosophical rigor as we search for
some standard of the "good" against which to
measure our virtue and our character. Yet, in terms
of making a moral difference, these virtues may well
be essential.
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They make a difference to both the health care
provider and to the patient. I can recall observing the
manner in which various LPNs cared for my father
during his stay in a long term care facility before his
death. He was fragile; I worried that they would not
be attentive or caring. I wanted them to be
considerate and patient and loyal to him. I wanted
my father to be more than an "obligation" for them. I
wanted them to realize that he was more than a
"bearer of rights", as Cohen has put it, that he
"should receive gestures that confer respect." 23
From my own observations of clinical practice, I
know that in addition to a realization of one's
obligations and the need for virtue, health
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professionals must learn to live with ambiguity and
uncertainty. Our current rationalistic theory (I would
agree with Kass) abhors messiness, inexactitude,
ambiguity. However, medicine and even more so,
biomedical research, especially as it grows and
evolves and even succeeds as a science, often leaves
us confused, ethically and politically, and even
clinically. I was surprised and delighted with a
particularly disarming response to a recent Hastings
Center Report case study. The case study questions
the morality of the laboratory creation of transgenic
animals or transspecies chimera. Freedman and
Goulet, in their commentary, readily concede that
such transspecies manipulation is not, as they put it,
"business as usual." To address this challenge, they
counsel that, "We will need to canvas our traditions,
religious and cultural as well as ethical, for clues ...
we will need to entertain and explore new principles
of reasoning, too." They conclude their
commentary with the thought that, "We are not
suggesting that transpecies manipulation be banned,
nor are we prepared to say how it should be
controlled. We are simply wondering how we
should think about it. All that we are certain of is
how this inquiry should start: with somber awe." 24
Freedman and Goulet's counsel is a fitting
conclusion to this paper. Pellegrino's hoped-for
rapprochement between philosophical ethics and
medicine is not yet complete. Current philosophical
ethics has proposed to medicine a framework of
values or theories that does not fit medicine's
complex needs. To make the fit, in addition to
abstract theories and principles of rights and
obligation, there is need to make accommodations for
the concrete, even the non-rational, for uncertainty,
for interconnectedness, for virtue and character. I
don't see the resolution of our dilemma to be an
either/or choice--rationalism versus non-rationalism.
And certainly dealing with dualisms is not new to
philosophy. But like Freedman and Goulet, I think
that to further this rapprochement, we must "canvas
our traditions, religious and cultural, as well as
ethical;" we must "entertain and explore new
principles of reasoning, too. "25
And in the meantime, I believe that I must re-examine
and broaden what it is I am teaching health
professionals. I cannot portray current theories as
the whole and only truth. I cannot present the four
26
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prevailing principles (the "mantra" of bioethics as
Jonsen calls them) of bioethics--autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, as the full
and adequate armamentarium that health
professionals will need in daily practice. The next
paper will be much more difficult than this first.
2. llid. p. 15.
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